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ABOUT THE DOCUMENT
This document evolved from a speech delivered by Mr. Flaherty at the
Corporate Health care Cost Containment Symposium.

Five speech modules/alternatives have been developed for use by

other speakers from the Plan.

Slides are also available to aid in

the presentation of these speeches.

Training in speech preparation,

writing, and delivery is available to those who desire it.

All speeches should contain three opening steps and one closing step.
OPENING STEPS

1.

Greet the audience.

Thank the Master of Ceremonies for the

introduction and thank the audience for the opportunity to speak.

2.

use an appropriate warm-up exercise to get the attention of the

·J.

Get the audience involved by asking a question that requires a

audience.

Examples include anecdotes, jokes, cartoons, etc.

response (e.g., show of hands, rising, voice response) or some

peer activity.
CLOSING STEP

The closing step must at least contain a thank you to the
audience.

Housekeeping (if necessary) and question solicitation

(if planned) are often appropriate.

If you have any questions about the speeches or the available speech

training, contact the Corporate Research Department.
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4.

INTRODUCTION

Think of this talk as a smorgasbord to stimulate questions.

I don't

think I will lack for being controversial, but I would like to be

responsive to your questions and concerns rather than close anything
out with my comments.
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Blue cross and Blue Shield of Florida is a mutual
insurance company that:
o
o
o

offers private insurance
contracts with the Federal government
operates health maintenance organizations
(HMOs)

It has three operating HMOs and the business plan for the next four

years calls for an additional seven HMOs.

This is a very special community because on the one hand it has the
state's leader industrially as well as from the standpoint of risk

taking and innovation.

on the other hand, it has a key center for

the services that the community needs as has been shown by the

earlier demonstration -- an obviously innovative, risk-taking

approach to the management of that health care center.

The

ingredients for successfully managing change seem to be here and
that's why I'm so pleased to be participating.
5.

GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION AND REGULATION

I've just come off a stint of 15 months as a member of the

Governor's Task Force where I sometimes was treated by those who

favor regulation as being to the right of •Atilla the Hun•.

The

verbiage would suggest success for the competitive model, but the

reality suggests success for regulation.

I will be happy to get

into the details of the recommendations during the question and
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answer period, but the philosophy and the endorsement and the

generalities are toward the marketplace while the real bottom line
is toward regulation.

The one chart I refused to put up was the one that goes straight up
which shows health care cost.

I thought that one wasn't needed

because all of you are dealing with cost centers or profit and loss

statements or some other aspects of the pricing problem.

We are in

a critical juncture in terms of that line because there is in

Florida a move to do something about it which is evidence to us of
anticipatory price increases that are further burting the

inflationary problem as people try to improve their margins in

anticipation of State rate regulation.
take action in the near term.

6.

We think there is a need to

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY

One of the topics that I want to discuss is the notion that insurers
are not really involved in cost containment; they're passive; they
funnel money; they act as co�duits.

Here is a very brief summary of

what I've seen over a period of years.
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History of the Health Insurance Business
(Depression to mid-sixties)
o Came out of the Depression
o Begun by trustee s of hospitals worried about
bankruptcies
o Received tremendous consumer acceptance
o Joined by the insurance industry
o Federal government expanded the hospital
system through funding techniques
o About ninety percent of the public was covered
by the mid-sixties
This business came out of the depression; it was largely started by
trustees of hospitals who were worried about bankruptcies and it
received tremendous consumer acceptance; the insurance industry
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joined them and there was explosive growth.

over the years the

Federal government expanded the hospital system through its various
funding techniques.

By the middle sixties, prior to Medicare and

with the exce ption of the Medicare population, there was

overwhelmingly available coverage; ninety or so percent of the
public was covered.
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History of the Health Insurance Business
(Mid-sixties to present)
o
o

o
o

Steady expansion of benefits since the
mid-sixtie s
Early efforts to restrict costs
auditing books
o
measuring reasonable charges
o
physician fee schedules
o
o
negotiations
Shift of concern from adequate coverage to
containing costs
Experiment in prospective reimbursement of
hospitals

Since the middle sixties, there has been a steady expansion in the
scope of benefits into a vaFiety of areas such as dental.

e fforts to restrict cost contained a silent assumption that

Early

hospitals were well-intentioned, efficient, and basically under the
control of.the industrial leadership of their communities.

Therefore, early cost-containment efforts were focused upon
questions like:

Can I audit your books?

have a measure of reasonable charges?

(Blue Cross Plan) or Do I

(which is the peer group

comparison for a traditional insurance plan).
These went on and on.

Look at some of the Northeastern and

Midweste rn Blue Cross Plans; their contracts with hospitals put

limits on pension costs, on interest costs, on operating margins, on

expansion programs -- generally making them subject to some other

community voluntary agency for review and approval for purposes of

expansion.
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Physicians started with fee schedules.

Some in many states agreed

not to balance bill for any additional amount.

e quity among specialties came into play.
down.

The problem of·

The fee schedules broke

Medicare in the steel industry said, •we have a better way.

We'll pay you your going charge as long as we determine it to be
reasonable. •

Then we entered into a spiral far in excess of what

was expected in the fee area.

Since that time there have been more efforts at negotiations.
some have been successful in some states, there have been

As

·negotiations with state government formally or informally involved.
Since about 1972, and 1975 in particular, when the wage/price

controls were lifted, industry was confronted with the rising cost
problem.

The real focus of attention shifted from adequate coverage

(i. e. , access to coverage, are people covered?) to what can we do

about the cost?

Of course, I'm not mentioning the tremendous demand

that came about because of Medicare during the same period.

In the early seventies, e xperiments in prospective reimbursement of

hospitals such as what Medicare has just adopted were put into

place.

Other efforts included expansion of out-of-hospital

benefits.

(Incidentally, as an insurer this has always come back. to

bite me with larger cost.
there are many. )

It's one of those false hopes of which

Second opinions, pre-admission testings, pre

admission certification, length-of-stay certification, tight medical
necessity provisions, highly sophisticated computer systems, and

various other techniques have all been used and generally at the

margin do some good.
7.

NERVOUS AND MENTAL CONDITIONS

One of the very profound studies that has been done on expanded
se rvices has to do with nervous and mental conditions and the
treatment of those on an out-of-hospital basis.

Massachusetts

passed a law saying that if you paid a psychiatrist, you have to pay
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a psychologist.

So we have a little study that says if you want to

raise psychologist's income to those of psychaitrist's, just pass

that kind of a lawo

The only thing that has happened is that the

charges for the psychologist have risen and there has been no

reduction in payments to psychiatrists.

Those kinds of perverse effects all seem to flow out of the basic
notion that these plans were designed to get people to use care;

they were designed to stimulate the development of an industry and
have done that very well.
8.

But they're obviously obsolete.

OTHER FALSE HOPES

8a. COINSURANCE AND DEDUCTIBLES
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Coinsurance and Deductibles
o

Coinsurance and deductibles are only
effective in the short term.

o

over ninety-five percent of what we sell in
Florida has coinsurance and deductibles.

o

After a one-year savings for reducing the
scope of benefits, the rate of increase
resumes._

The other false hope that I want to step on in order to stimulate
some discussion later on is that coinsurance and deductibles will
make things better.

over 95% of what we sell in the State of

Florida has coinsurance and deductibles.

Generally speaking, once

you get the one-year savings for reducing the scope of benefits, the

rate of increase takes right off again.

Another notion suggests

that if employees aren't involved, they're not careful.

We have a

large group of state of Florida employees (84, 000 people covered) .

On average, the Plan pays 50% of billed charges.
parts:

That's made of two

the employer pays a large part of the cost of the program

and the employee generally pays 20% and anything over the first $100
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goes under the coinsurance provision (he pays the first $100).

There are numerous fixed dollar limits within the plan to limit the
liability.

Even with those limits and the employee paying perhaps

half of the total cost of the premium, the rates of increase of that

plan generally match that of the rest of the population.
but one of many examples.

This is

8b. HEALTH SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY
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Health services for the Elderly
o

Medicare pays about fifty percent of
out-of-hospital services for patients over 65.

o

Fifty percent is not paid due to being:
o
o
o

higher than allowable charges
disallowed because of administrative or
necessity reasons
subject to the coinsurance and deductible
provisison of the program

Another one you may not be familiar with is health services for the
elderly. Medicare pays about 5 0% of the billed out-of-hospital
services for patients over 65 .

Fifty percent is not paid as being

higher than allowable charges, disallowed because of administrative
or medical necessity reasons, or subject to the coinsurance and
deductible provision that applies in that program.

Notwithstanding

that, the most rapid rate of increase and usage is in the
out-of-hospital service area.

so the appeal of the involvement of

the patient seems to be an intuitive one, not necessarily born out
in the real world in which we operate.
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8c. FORD EXPERIMENT
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Ford Experiment
o

If the patient doesn't pay the doctor the
deductible and coinsurance, it shows up as a
bad debt.

o

The bad debt shows up as an increase in the
cost of d oing business -- which becomes a
legitimate basis for raising his price.

o

The same is true for the hospital.

There is an inte resting experiment going on by Ford which gets at
another weakness of coinsurance and deductible programs.

like this.

It works

If the patie nt doesn't pay the doctor the deductible and

coinsurance , it shows up as a bad debt.

The bad debt shows up as an

increase in the cost of doing business and that becomes a legitimate
basis for raising his price.
hospital.

The same thing is also true for the

Unless you make the assumption that those bad debts are

all being colle cted, they c�n have the effect of being a •le gitimate

basis for raising the price of service . • We see evidence in some

parts of the community where the coinsurance provisions are simply

not billed; there's really a dual-price structure and the prices are
set based upon what the income and overall experience is.

9.

SELF-FUNDING

In addition to efforts at cost containment, there has been

tremendous growth in the area of self-funding administration.

Self

funding is encouraged by a lot of insurers whose experience tells

them that if they can give up one to two percent of income and get

off the risk in the health insurance business that's a good business

deal for them -- which says something about whether it's a good
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business deal for the business and industry group.

The record

interest rate on reserves that was earned in the late seventies and
early eighties was a definite stimulus, but

self-insurance/self-administration is the single most rapidly

growing phenomena in the health insurance field.
10. DATA GATHERING FOR ANALYSIS

Finally, there has been a tremendous increase in the emphasis on

data for analysis, which is one of the healthiest things that's
going on.

There is one large national employer (AT&T) who requires

an enormous amount of data for every single claim transaction.

for the purpose of �djudicating the claim, but rather for the

Not

purpose of analyzing and determining what variations are occurring
in the various operating areas.

business analysis.
potential.

This is a problem amenable to

More of a direct analysis activity has real

During this period also the insurers have learned that

there may be business out there they can get but they may not want

it.

They have tried to tighten their underwriting.

The industry

newsletter recently carried a lead article saying there's all the
small group health insurance you can sell in the market, but the

trick is to do it and break even and make a little bit of money on

it.

The industry thus far has not really been passive, but obviously has
not been successful.

Keep this quote in mind:

• traditional health

insurance is not sick, it's dead; it just has not been buried. •
have to explain that and we're having some fun.

11. END SPEECH HERE OR BRIDGE TO THE NEXT MODULE

NOTE:

If this module begins a new speech, use steps 1-3 and

continue.

If it is a continuation of the previous module,

follow the numbering system.
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INTRODUCTION OR BRIDGE
Slide 1/7
Alternative Approaches to cost Containment:
Third Party Payor Perspective

I would like to briefly get into some public policy questions and
some statistics.

I'll try not to belabor you with statistics you've

probably already seen.

I'll focus a little on the insurance

industry and then on some alternatives.
Slide 2/8

Approaches for containing Health care costs:
Market Reform vs. Direct Economic Regulation.
First of all we think that the key is competition vs. economic
regulation.

But we think it's not competition as the world has

been, it's market reform -- without which competition works poorly.
5/13.

WHAT IS HEALTH CARE?
Slide 3/9
What is Health care

1.
2�
3.

A Monopoly?
A Competitive Industry?
A Developing Competitive Industry?

What is health care?

If it's a monopoly it ought to be regulated.

discipline to occur.

Perhaps its a developing competitive industry

If-it's a competitive industry there's a chance for marketplace

that needs to move either into category one or two above.
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COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF REGULATION VERSUS INCENTIVES
IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR
Regulation Favored

Incentives Favored

Few providers

Many providers
Complex product
Many products

Simple product
Single or few products

Low responsiveness to price changes
Good information on costs and quantities

High responsiveness to price· changes
Poor information, hard to interpret
Strong potential for detrimental
adaptation

· Weak potential for detrimental
adaptation to regulation
Few poor performers in large arena
Single, clear objective

Most performers displaying similar behavior
Multiple, subtle objectives

Source: Adapted from Zeckhauser & Zook (1981)

If you look at standard economic analysis of those industries where

regulation could be favored versus those where incentives could be
favored, you can see under regulation a lot of the simplifications

that legislative committee staffs like to make.

Unless you can make

those assumptions you will fail in regulations -- such as good

information on cost and quantities, definition of products, and
clear ob jectives, and so on.

The right-hand side of this slide

describes more of what's really involved in this industry.
fundamental inadequacy, the fourth line down:
to price changes.

With one

high responsiveness

At the transaction of delivering care that is not the case; that is
why market reform is essential.

The multiplicity and the subtle

nature of many of the ob jectives makes it very difficult for
judgments to be made.

If any of you read the Wall Street Journal

article of a few months back on the British National Health System

and decision making, it's very clear that money is allocated

according to the political process (i. e. , according to which
community has the most politicial influence) .

11

If you have not dealt

with the state government and know that the state agency staff

depend upon friendly legislators for their appropriations and other
things, then the idea that there's some logical, rational decision
making going on in state government is really a threat to good

decision making for us, because we may assume something will happen

that won't happen.

POSITION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA

6/14.
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Position of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida:
1. Desire a sound, not lavish, health care
system in Florida.
2. Need to facilitate innovation and
experimentation in delivery and financing of
care.
3. Change must occur in current adversarial
relationship as regulatory agencies come
under increasing pressure to solve health
care costs problem.
We try to advocate a sound, but not lavish, health care syste m.

We

need to facilitate innovation and experimentation in the delivery
and financing of care.

take risk.

By f�cilitate we mean also the ability to

Change must occur in the current adversarial

relationship as regulatory agencies come under increasing pressure
to solve health care cost problems.

We need more cooperative,

mutually supportive relations between the public and private sector,

a genuine desire to reform the marketplace and the desire to deal

with the •disease • rather than the symptoms.

If we have a fear, it

is that the hospital industry will decide that the changes necessary

for competition are too wrenching and, therefore, find regulation

preferable.
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4.

Seek more cooperative, mutually supportive
relations between public and private sector.
Assuming a genuine desire to reform market
place, to deal with • disease,• rather than
symptoms, regulatory agencies should promote
informed buying by consumers and facilitate
meeting consumer need by insurers, coalitions
and others.

6.

Seek deregulation, but not before
restructuring of market to establish sound
market conditions.
Market reform is consistent with fundamental
beliefs of our society.
Placing greatest possible reliance on
decentralized decision making is especially
pertinent in health care, due to political
obstacles to efficient governmental planning
and regulation.

s.

7.
8.

See k deregulation specifically regarding ce rtificate of need, but
not before restructuring the market to establish sound market

conditions.

The planning agency in Jacksonville is confronted with

announced statements that there will be four HMOs operating in

Jacksonville.

They suddenly have a problem.

The problem is the

formula they have been using to decide how many hospitals beds are

needed is more hospital beds than we will need.

The agency was only

set up to keep hospitals from building beds, not to figure out what

to do when we have a surplus of beds and we won't need any more for
years to come.

Market reform is cons(stent with the fundamental

beliefs of our society; the notion of decentralized decision making

is especially pertinent in health care.

There really is no way for

a person working in an analytical role in Tallahassee to unde rstand
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the differences between Melbourne and other communities and their
needs for appropriate services.

We need to reinforce recent actions

at the national and state levels to create a market conducive to

market reform proposals.

Slide 7/13

9.

Reinforce recent actions at national and
state level to create a market conducive to
market reform proposals:
A. Federal government - D.R.G.'s - hospitals
now have burden of controlling own costs.
B •. Private and public negotiations with
individual hospitals over price - PPO's,
BMO's etc.
10. Purchase of indigent care by state, based on
price and efficiency.
The Federal government has moved this way with their DRGs.

If you

haven't heard about Miami and the Medicare experiment, DRGs are mild

compared to what's going on in Miami.

West.

It's kind of like the old

There is a competitive model experiment under way, the reason

stated is to find out all the good and the bad of competition.

There are a number of operators and HMOs who are promising the world
and the public is flocking to them in tens of thousands.

question is:

Will they give quality care?

reasonable waiting periods?

responsible way?

Now the

Will they give it with

Will they deal financially in a

our quess is that some will and some won't.

because some don't the whole idea is thrown out instead of

If

establishing conditions for succe ss, we will have lost an important

opportunity -- private and public negotiations with indiv�dual
hospitals over price and use.

Most of the systems today really are

talking about price and use combined.
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Finally, purchase of indigent care by the State based on price and

efficiency.

Another way of saying it is •competitively bid.•

so,

if I were to try and summarize what we see as the necessary steps,

those would be the key questions and what we think some of the key
issues are.

7/15 .

HEALTH CARE COSTS
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FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR GROWTH
IN TOTAL HEALTH CARE COSTS
1971-1981
Percent Contribution
Population

7.9%

General Inflation

56.8%

Health-Specific Inflation

7.0%

Greater Volume/Sophistication of Services

Source: Freeland & Schendler, 1983

28.3%

I would like to briefly go into a few statistics to highlight some

features that may not be immediately available to you.

This study

was contracted out by the Health care Financing Administration to

break out health care inflation into its component parts:

what was

due to population, what was due to general inflation, what was due

·to health specific inflation, and the greater volume and
sophiscation of services.
of that.

I would like to dramatize the last part
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A few ye�rs ago there was a publication put out by the American

Hospital Association that looked at the number of x-rays ordered per
patient day in teaching hospitals •.

It actually was finer than that,

teaching hospitals with 3 00 or more beds.

The results showed that

the number of x-rays per patient day was increasing at an annual

rate of 15 % per year (i. e. , volume of services per patient day).
as the technology change s, there are usage factors in there and

so

given the complexity of the product, it's really very, very hard to

nail down.

the subject.

This is the most definitive study that we're aware of on
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NATIONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORY - 1982
($ billion)

Category
Physicians
Hospital
Nursing Home
Drugs
Personal Health
(dentists, eyeglasses, home health)
Other Health Expenditures
TOTAL

$

%

62

19

136

42

40
�
$323

12
11

27
22

100%

Source: Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board, 1983-84. Numbers do not add to total due to rounding.

This slide shows the expenditures by category.

The hospital

industry is getting the focus of attention for several reasons:

it's the largest single number; it's the most heavily insured

number; and politically it's the group that you can get your hands

on.

We in the insurance business don't see he alth care cost
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increases the way they are recorded to the public.

The way they're

recorded to the public typically is in terms of the price increase .

The Jacksonville General Hospital raised its chart structure by 12%
this year.

The true cost -- which shows up in the claims that are

paid by the employer and the insurance plan
effect of price and use .

is the compound
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C>

PRICE x USE = TOTAL COST
· e.g. $400/procedure x SO/procedures = $24,000

C>

COMPOUND EFFECTS OF PRICE AND USE.
$400 (1.11) X 60 (1.10) =
$444 X 66 = $29,304

+

22.1%

This slide shows that an 11% and a 10% increase produce a 22%
increase in payouts.

That's the number that determines employee

benefit costs, insurance plan costs, and premium increases.

That's

the number the consume r is confronted with -- which is why there is
so much popular support for rate regulation among the general

public.

The compound effect of these numbers is turning out to be

staggering.

so the core is to get at both price and use.
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RATE INCREASES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE INDUSTRY
a.

Introduction
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FLORIDA GROUP ACCIDENT
& HEAL TH INSURANCE
MARKET SHARE IS FRAGMENTED*:

• Nearly 600 Companies Earning Group
Accident and Health Premiums
• Only 4 Firms Have Market Shares
Exceeding 5%
• Only 19 Firms Have Market Shares
Exceeding 10/o
• Top 1 O Firms Account for 590/o
of Premiums Written
• Top 50 Firms Account for 85% of Premiums
Written; Remaining 15% Shared by More
Than 500 Carriers
•Market Shares Computed on Basis of Premiums Written In
Florida on Group Accident and Health, 1981
Source: Florida State Insurance Department Annual Reports

How have rates increased and affected the health insurance
industry?

In Florida there are 600 companies earning group

premiums, four firms have market shares exceeding 5%, 19 have market
shares exceeding 1%, the top 10 firms account for 59%; the top 50
firms account for 85%.

That is about as close as you can come to a

textbook example.to pure competition.

can do to dominate the market.
than in the Northern states.

There is not much any of us

This is a very different situation

We have about 15% of the market and we

would guess that Aetna -- because they do so much ASO work which is
not reported as premiums -- probably is around 12 or 13%.
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HEAL TH INSURANCE INDUSTRY
TOTAL UNDERWRITING LOSSES
(IN MIWONS)

Commercial Insurers

1980

1 98 1

1 982

($1 ,431 .3)

($2,035. 1 )

($2,31 4.2)

426.5)

($ 463.8)

($ 494.5)

Blue Cross - Blue Shield

Source: Argus Charts, 1 981-83
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association
Note: The Afl1(11 Chart data (based on NAIC Statement Blank, Schedule H) do not Include any sources of Income
ottw than premiums. Therefore, It ,s poS-'31ble 111a1 any given company'• underwriUng l'NUJta may �
fflOf9 negative than their reported net galn.

The industry as a whole, from its health insurance activities has
successively lost (taking the commercial insurers as a group) 1. 4 to
2. 3 billion dollars. The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans have lost

approximately half a billion dollars over each of the last three
years.

There was some improvement in 1983, but not significant

improvement.

Basically, health insurance is a losing business.

Interest income on the money involved in current business does not

begin to offset those losses.

You might be interested in some

hometown numbers.
b.

Ex12lanation
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WEIGHTED A VERA GE
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN THE PRICE
OF INSURANCE PREMIUMS - BLUE CROSS &
BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA

39.8%
23.5%

1 980

•vear to Date

1 981

lourc:e: Blue en.. & Blue Sh6eld of Florida

l 'J

30.0%

29.5%

1 982

1 983 *

This slide shows the average rate of increase that our customers
would have had to have pay if they continued to take the same

benefits in the next year as they had in the last year.

Every time

you give someone a rate increase you may induce some bargaining and
negotiation that results in a contract change.

If you want to see something instructive, though, look at 198 1.

1980 we converted all of our small accounts to deductible and

coinsurance as a cost-saving technique.

In

What happened was that our

income tended to level off and then we had an explosive increase in

cost.

In 198 1 we had a $ 15, 000 , 000 loss from underwriting

operations.
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COMPONENTS OF HEALTH INSURA NCE PREMIUM

.

RI SK

- 2½%

EXPECTED
CLAIMS
COST

-- 90 %

ADMINISTRATIVE
COST

- 7½ %

Nole: PilfcenlagM lhown .,. I OI' Blue Crou & Bl ue Shield of Flonca

The make-up of this rate, assuming it is a group of say 100

employees or so.

Claims would account for about 90%, the

administrative cost would account for 7-1/2%, and the risk and

contingency factor assuming it was fully insured would account for
about 2-1/2%.

That would be what we would assume to be the case as

we set the rate.

In fact, we have not been able to obtain the

2-1/2% due to price competition in the industry.

20
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Clalma
Payout ·

t♦

RATE MAKING PROBLEM

..

1:

9

.,.

t•

3�3

►14

12

t,
►If

30 months

.. . today

c.

·1

MONTHS

t.

Time Factor

one of the problems we are faced with is the long time periods over
which we make a financial guarantee.

We begin in one time period

( shown on the left hand side - of the chart) to accumulate

experience.

At about the end of the twelve months, we have a set of

data which then must be seasoned for three more months .

So that at

the end of 15 months we have data which we consider useful for

analysis for setting the next year's rate.

We then enter into about

a 30 day period of analysis and rate making and then 60 days with

the customer going back and forth.

(He may wish to change the plan

or the way it operates in some way.) Finally, at point T 2 a rate
goes into effect which is generally guaranteed for 12 more months
and for which claims do not come in until 15 months .

so that 30

months later we look at decisions that were made based upon

assumptions gained in our previous business and then adapted through
that 30 month period .

Now, depending upon when renewal periods are,

that can change slightly .

But there is a fair degree of hazard .

you look at the reserves of any insurer (except the largest) in
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If

terms of how many years in a row they could miss their estimate by
5%, it generally is not a lot of years or there wouldn't be an

insurer around.
9/17.

SELF-INSURANCE
Slide 16/22

HEALTH PLAN FINANCING AR RANGEMENTS
Category

1978

1 980

Insurance Company

57%

53%

Blue Crossn31ue Shield

16

11

Self-Insured

16 \

26

23%

Self-Insured with 501 (c)(9) Trust

7

10

Not Indicated

4

0

1 982

.,
l l
42%
16

36

�

41 %

14

Source: Group Benet� Sulvey, The Wyatt Company, Actuaries and Consullanta, 1978, 1980, and 1982.

Self-insurance has been stimulated by both inflation and interest

rates as well as other concerns.
Wyatt Company.
4 1% in 1982.

This is national data from the

The percent of self-insured went from 23% in 1978 to

And there are numbers to indicate that its well over 50% in
Florida.

Of the 22 firms in the south Florida Coalition, 21 are

self-insured.

Slide 17/23

HOW IS YOUR A1EDJCAL. BENEFITS
PLAN FINANCED?
Insured
Self Funded
Minimum Premium
Other

Private
Sector

Public
Sector

Total

470/o
350/o
1 5%
20/o

42%
39%
1 3%
50/o

47%
36%
1 5%
3%

Sou rce: 1 983 Survey of Employer Health Care Benefits Plans
and Coat Containment Initiatives
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A recent south Flori da c oalition survey of empl oyers indicated that
a total of 36 and 15 we re either self-insured or partially
self-insured, but that was not all of the employers.
sector, but not all of them.
10/18.

It was a large

AUDIENCE QUESTION (END SPEECH OR BRIDGE TO NEXT MODULE )

What can you conclude from this and my earlier brief recitation of
cost containment efforts?

Slide 18/24

Conclusion

o

The current products of the industry reflect primarily the

o

The goal has now shifted from • unlimited access• to

o

Choices for insurers:

goal of public policy which was access to care.
• efficiency.•

A.

Invest in redesigning products that ensure cost

B.

Reduce benefits signifi cantly in the traditional product

c.

Drop out of health insurance.

effective delivery of health care.

( and try and stay below your trend lines) .

we see all of these being done .

Equitable is the best example of c,

having dropped out of writing groups of 100 lives or less which is
traditionally where you're fully insured .

Prudential is an example

of an insurer putting a heavy emphasis on A -- with the tremendous
emphasis they're putting on the Pruc are program to get their HMOs

operational.

Of course , they took the worst loss of any single

company in any single year two years ago.
NOTE :

If this module begins a new speech, use steps 1-3 and

continue .

I f it is a continuation of the previous module,

follow the numbering syste m .

23

-��--

4/ 11/19.

INTRODUCTION OR BRIDGE

5/12/2 0.

PUBLIC POLICY

A couple of very important points about public policy .

There is

unbelievable support by the working public for health insurance and

broad benefits.

You could get a strike faster in the auto industry

by talking about adding a two dollar deductible than you could by
taking a lot of money off the table.

That was the real world of how

they viewed things and their value system.

There are three reasons for that that are not always remembered .

First of all, during the Korean war and to some degree before there
we re wage controls, but there were no limits on benefits.

taught people that benefit dollars were valuable dollars.

It really

Secondly,

you have a tax policy that says every dollar in benefits you get is
equal to $1. 2 0 in salary.

That hasn't been lost on the public.

Thirdly, the treme ndous flow of dollars has brought about for many
people -- not necessarily in Florida, but for many people -- a
reassurance that the provider of care will take the insurance

payment and that user will not have a resi dual obligation.

The

combination of those three factors means that there's little or no

popular support for cutting those benefits.

Medicare will not cut

its basic benefit plan in the face of the current cost pressure, not

unle ss there is a restructuring of the financing and delivery system
itself.

issue .

so this basic notion of obsolescence is really the crucial

· 6/13/21 .

COST SHIFT
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Slide 1/19/25

COST SHI FT

CHARGE LEVEL
CHARGE LEVEL"
COST

OPERATI N G

MARG I N

M EDICARE

PRIVATE
PAYOAS

M EDICARE

All payors pay charges In full.

a.

PRIVATE
PAYOAS

Medicare pays less than
charges below cost hospltal raises charges to
private payors to recover
unpaid costs and margin.

Hospital Industry

The famous cost shift.

A cost shift is considered to have occurred

in the hospital industry, not when someone fails to pay cost, but

when someone fails to pay the price that management has determined

on average should be paid.

That automatically assumes that the

margin is reasonable an d appropriate.

There's a long history behind

that concept, going back to when hospitals were essentially

community service agencies.

The AHA worked with a lot of other

folks to develop what was called the principles of financial

requirements.

They tried to define the economics necessary to

· survive and maintain plant and equipment, maintain currency with
technology, and serve the community.
accounting costs.

That number is more than just

Some margin is definitely needed for the business as a whole.

the other hand, there are profit and non-profit hospitals who

On

publicly say that an operating margin of 15% or more is appropriate.
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Now how many businesses do we have in America that are guaranteed
15 % on sales? The first sound assumption is that the charges have
been set to produce the right total amount of revenue.
b.

Medicare

The second observation relates to Medicare.
Medicare history.

Here ' s a litt le

Prior to Medicare in 1 965, the Blue Cross P lans

in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Michigan and a few other states,

working with community industry leaders, had set limits on what they
would pay hospitals for care.

The purpose was to encourage

efficiency in order to guarantee hospital survival.

very general limits.

But they were

The examp les used earlier were of pension, interest, and a few
others.

Medicare was faced with deciding how to pay hospitals.

Their staff discovered what B lue Cross was doing and they baked it
into a formula.

If a Blue cross P lan wou ld not pay for a certain

interest or other cost, it general ly wou ld pay 2% above what

hospital costs were cal culated to be.

The intent was to a llow

hospita ls to meet their working capital requirement and to fund

needed expansion because the historical price leve l depreciation may

not have been adequate in those days of 1, 2, or 3% inflation.

Medicare used that guideline to begin with; it also used a factor

for the greater intensity of the over 65.

As time went on and

Medicare got into budgetary trouble, those guidelines were

e liminated.

Thus, what may have started off being a good idea is

not · practiced today.

There is no attempt to recognize the economic

cost to the hosptia l for serving the aged.

In some cases the

Medica r � payment may be covering it, in other ca ses it may not be.

The result is interesting.

If the number of people under Medicare

in the right hand box is greater than the number of people that are
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in the Private Pay category, then given Medicare ' s payment and the

hospital's need for the same amount of dollars, the private payers
will pay more.

We could get to the ultimate contradication where

95% of the patients were Medicare and they only pay, say $10 less a

day than they need to pay, but the hospital has to get that $10 per

patient day from the remaining 5 % of the patients .

Therefore, the

hospital may charge the private pay patients $100 a day more than is
needed.

c.

What Is A�riate?

The key question in all of this is:

first place?

Jacksonville:

What is appropriate in the

Let me describe the situation that's developed in

Jac ksonville is overbedded with more than four beds

per thousand, and it's a young population group.

If these HMOs are

operational, the Jacksonville market may need only three beds per

thousand.

Should all those hospitals have plans for capital

accumulation for future plant and equipment expansion for a greater

number of beds?

beds?

or should they be looking at reducing the number of

The problem arises b�cause there is no price discipline

forcing hospitals to ma ke judgments based upon the market place .
is an extremely complicated issue.
7/14/22.

It

HOSPITAL GROSS REVENUE
Sl ide 2/20/ 2 6

FLO RI DA H OS P ITAL G ROSS R EVE N U E
P E R ADJ U ST E D PATI ENT DAY
G ross Reve n u e
E s ti m at e d g ro s s reve n u e i f a l l p at i e n ts
paid ful l charges·
Est i m ated c o s t s h i f t
Source: F lorid a H o s p l t a l Cost Co n t a i n ment Board
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1 979

1 980

1 981

$271

$3 1 3

$374

$21 7

$247

$293

$ 54

$ 66

$ 81

This slide shows some numbers that are currently available on the
average gross revenues for hospitals in Florida for the three years
1970, 19 80, and 198 1 : 271, 313, 3 74.

That's what hospitals would

have generated if everybody paid charges.
others do not.

Medicare does not, many

The gross revenue that would have been required if

everyone paid full charges is shown the next line down :
and 293.

217, 247,

The resultant mark-up over and above the average cost that

covers the margin that the hospital claims is needed is on the order
of $54, $66, and $ 8 1 a day.
cross, Aetna, etc.

It is paid by private industry, Blue

There is a problem, but it varies from community to community and

from hospital to hospital.

Because of the way the Medicare program

is funded, there is little li kelihood that the problem will be

corrected by Medicare agreeing to pay more .
Slide 3/21/ 2 7

Effect ive and fair price mechanism felt by
providers and consumers does not exist.

a.

consumers ( physicians and patients ) haven ' t
been directly movtivated by price or
efficiency of providers due to impact of
traditional third party payments

b.

Payers haven ' t been able to negotiate with
providers because they haven ' t been the ones
to choose providers and didn ' t influence
their choice.

We feel that effective and fair price mechanisms do no t exist as
· they should to affect provider and consumer behavior .

Consumers

have not been directly motivated by price or efficiency of providers

due to the impact of traditional third-party payments .

Regardless

of the deductible and coinsurance, if I go to a high-charging

physician or an inefficient hospital, I have the same personal
obligation.

In most communities in Florida, there is a 100% range

from low to high within specialties for the same service in the
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charges of physicians•

So regardless of what you tinker with in the

way of deductibles and coinsurance, you don't get at problem A.

Payers haven't been able to neg otiate with providers because they

haven't be en the ones to choose the providers and didn't influence
their choice.

Slide 4/2 2/28

c.

Providers have had no incentive as to price
or efficiency because consumers were not
impacted.

d.

Provide rs are not in an equ al position to
compete because of disproportionate
distribution of societal cos ts.

Providers have not had an incentive as to price or efficiency
because consumers were not affected.

c an you imagine the provider

who reduces his investment for amenities and has a competitor who

expands his amenities when the insurance plan pays all but $ 100 for
each program?

Providers are not in an equ al position to compete

because of dispropriate distribution of societal costs.

We have

hosptials today in Florida who could reduce their costs to the

private payor by $ 100 a day if they were paid an appropriate amount
under Medicaid.
8/15/2 3.

CONCLUSIONS

( END SPEECH OR BRIDGE TO NEXT MODULE )

How can you ask the hospital that is serving the community with a

large number of indigents to compete on the basis of price without

equalizing the load?

These are some of the fundamental barriers to

the competitive system working.
a.

Approaches to achieve effective and fair price
competition
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S l i de 5/2 3/ 2 9

Approaches t o achieve effective and fair price
competition
1. Allow payers to negotiate on behalf of
insureds.
a. Insu red s agree to use only panel
providers ( HMO).
b. Insu reds receive some e conomic benefit
for u sing panel providers ( PPO).
c. As a result of a. and b. , providers have
new incentives for cost efficiencies.
The con clusion would suggest that approaches which achieve effective
and fair price competition are needed.

behalf of the insureds.

done.

Allow payers to negoti ate on

T here are a couple of ways that can be

Insureds agree to use only a panel of providers which is a

traditional HMO in one form or another, insureds receive some
economic benefit for u sing panel providers ( PPO).

The program we're

about to launch in Miami will say to the insured, if you go to one

of the more efficient providers, we will pay 8 0% of your cost after

$100 deductible .

If you g o to another provider in the community, we

will pay 6 5 % of your cost and $100 deductible.

It 's taken a while

for the market to accept that kind of a contract.

Basically, what

had to happen is the same thing that happened to the price of

gasoline.

once the price got to a certain level, people were

willing to �rive the T oyota.

But as long as it was below a certain

level, we hung onto the larger car, the old way of doing thing s.

There is something to be given up and that's choice.

The PPO

offers, whether it's a permanent or temporary phenomenon, the chance

of wide choice and the consumer receives a dire ct benefit if it's a

prudent choice.

As a result of ( a) and ( b) above, providers have new incentives for
cost efficiencies.

We know of hospit al ad ministrations that are

profiling their physician community, talking with and counselling
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�

the physicians who have a history of ordering a large number of
services -- disproportionate from their peer group for the same

service, for the same diagnosis.

In a cold, crass way that

physician used to be an opportunity; he's now a liability.

It's

become a problem for the institution and now they will manage it.
If the hospital operated more efficiently under the previous

Medicare system or the previous insurance plan, it just meant they

got paid less.
b.

Equalize providers ability to compete
Slide 6/24/30

2.

Equalize ability o f providers to compete by
equalizing societal costs.
a.
b.

In long term, increase government funding
and efficiency of purchasing,
In short term, equalize by efficiency of
purchasing, sharing of burden and other
means.

We must equalize the ablity of providers to compete by equalizing
societal costs.

In the long- term, increase government funding and

efficiency of purchasing.
Medicaid.

The first part of that has to do with

Florida is 48th or 49th out of the 5 0 states in funding

its Medicaid Program.

It has come out of a very limited tradition

in that regard and it will not change this year to any significant

degree.

working within the constraint of currently available funds,

you then get to (b) which is to equalize the burden among hospitals

by using a method of assessing hospitals a portion of what they have

been providing for indigent care; then giving it back to the

hospitals along with Federal matching monies for taking care of the
indigents, but based upon negotiated prices.

In effect, we will

take money out of the system, bring federal dollars in, match the
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two together and then use it to buy care on a competitive bid basis

or some form of competitive bid.

Those are essentially what I would

call the market reform characteristics.

Others would include

educating people and getting information out to coalitions, etc.
NOTE:

If this module begins a new speech, use steps 1-3 and

continue.

If it is a continuantion, go on with the numbering

system.

4/ 9/ 1 6/2 4 .

INTRODUCTION OR BRIDGE

5/ 1 0/ 1 7/2 5 . ASSESSING THE FLORIDA ENVIRONMENT

How would allowing payers to negotiate on behalf of insureds and
equalizing the ability of providers to compete play in Florida?
Slide 1/7/25/3 1

Assess i ng the Florida Environment
o
o
o
o
o

0

Population concentration in metropolitan
areas.
Growth of coalitions.
Prevalence of cost sharing in Florida.
over supply of physicians.
oversupply of beds in some areas.
Growth i n HMOS and PPOs .

How would it play in Florida?
metropolitan areas.

The population is concentrated in

That's important for the prospect of competition,

because an area that is only served by one group of physicians or one

facility may take the approach of saying I don't want to play.
a.

Coalitions
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Slide 2/8/26/ 3 2
Florida Bus iness Coalitions

Tampa

FLORIDA .
BUSINESS
COALITIONS

I

•

Polk County

St. Petersburg

Sources: Directory of Business Coalitions for Health Action.
Clearinghouse on Business Coalitions. March, 1984

Growth of coalitions - that's an informed buyer.
Florida coalition serves a wonderful role.

For example , the south

They took their claims data ,

matched it against the Hospital cost containment Board's published data

on the cost of certain kinds of treatment in hospitals in Florida , and

they found no relationship.

claims data.

They were dealing in reality; it was their

Because the Hospital Cost Containment Board is an agency of

state government , it has to do everything by rule.

The HCCB made a sound

assumption that whichever hospital you went to you got the same number of
services , the same length of stay , etc.

They created a hypothetical that

does not exist and then said to the public use that to compare -- which
is really counter-productive , although its not deliberate.
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Flori da i s a state that already has well establi shed cost-shari ng as
the standard in the employee community.

Y ou have to set your

benefits and wages to be competiti ve i n the labor market in whi ch
you compete. For a leadi ng org ani zati on such as the Harris

Corporati on that's a nati onal labor market, but at least for a large
number of employers, it's a local labor market.

Therefore, the wi de

prevalence of cost-sharing i n Flori da sets a good stage for the kind
of changes we think are needed.
b.

Physi ci an supply

There i s a rapidly increasi ng supply of physi ci ans and an oversupply
of beds.

Therefore, people are worri ed about patients.

We are

talki ng about the old fashioned busi ness of cutti ng pri ce i n order
to mai ntain market share.

Fi nally, there i s already a strong

indi cati on of the growth of HMOs and PPOs.
c. Access to HosEitals
Slide �/9/27/3 3
Access to Hospitals
o
o

87. 9% of F loridians live in metropolitan
areas ( SMSA ' s )
80 % of Florida hospita ls are in metropolitan
areas

source :

1980 u. s. Census , FHA Fact Book

Just touching on some of these points, 8 8 % of Flori di ans li ve i n
metropoli tan areas, 8 0% of the hospitals are located i n metropolitan

areas, about 8 0% of the populati on has access to two or more
hospi tals wi thin conveni ent dri ving di stance.
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Slide 4/10/28/34

FLORIDA
HMOs

March 1 984

■ Operational

• Developmental

0 Feasibility

This slide illustrates HMOs that are operational, formally in

development, or where feasibility studies are underway.

Incidently,

the big money players are getting into HMOs both through venture

capital activity and through the large insurance companies.
think this is an idea whose time has come for Florida.
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we

e.

Florida HMO Enro l lment

Slide - 5/11/2 9/3 5

FLORIDA HMO ENROLLMENT
1 ,335,000

=== Actual Enrollment

1 ,400

(30%)

�-�-X
'i�f�•
i.Y
;,:_4V�

�� Projected Enrollment
(% Change from previous year)

1 ,200

.

'ii'

'! 1 ,000
800
c:.

(38 %) f/i�;��l

�� i)t�

(26%) t\i ·'.· •:-;�� i¼:,n1;,.�

600
400

200
0
1 978

1 979

1 980

1 981

1 982

1 983

1 984

1 985

1 986

1 987

1 988

Sources: 1 ) National HMO Cencua, lnteratudy (1978-1983)
2) Blue CroH & Blue Shield of Florida, lnc. (1 983-1988 Pro)ectlona)

Here is the historica l growth and forecasted growth in HMO

enrollment.

If you look at the numbers they don't look very big

until you look at the annual rates of change:
80' - 46% over, and so on.

83' - 101% growth over 82.

this will be a significant force .

What they do is make price

Therefore, they stimu late other people's

innovation in changing the way they do things .

benefit.

We think

Don't assume that HMOs will

necessarily dominate the marketplace.
competition legitimate.

79' over 78' - 107%,

Therein lies the

I doubt that the 1990 form of organization for serving the

community is known ; . I don't think it's going to be what we are
selling today or planning to sell next year.
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6/11/18/ 26. NATIONAL PREMIUM INCREASES
Slide 6/12 /3 0 /3 6

NA TIONWIDE PREIL4/UM INCREASES
(I ndividual Coverage)
1 980

HMO

1 982

$44.40 · $57.37

Insurance
$39.48
Plans

$57.86

% Increase

29.2%
49%

Source: Federal Office of HMO, 1 983

This slide shows nationwide preimum increases for individual
coverage.

Between 1980 and 1982 there was a 2 9% increase for HMOs

and a 49% increase for insurance plans.

7/12/19/27. HMO HOSPITAL UTILIZATION
Slide 7/13/3 1/3 7

,,

HMO HOSPITAL UTILIZA TION JMPACT
(JUNE, 1 982)

: 1 700
1 500

i

f

1 300

i

900

i

!
%

1 1 00

961

700

458

496

All HMO's
Nationally

Florida
Blue Cross
Bwe Shield
HMO'a

500
300
0

National
Blue Cross
Blue Shield

Florida
Blue Cross Blue Shield

Source: OHMO, Blue Croa & Blue Shield Aaaoclatton
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The nati onal ut i li zati on average for all Blue Cross/Blue Shi eld
plans i s 700.

Flori da was higher than that, partly because of the

higher average age under 65 -- we have a lot of 5 0-5 5 year old

people.

HMOs nati onally were at 4 5 8 (that i s days per thousand per

year) , federally quali fi ed HMOs were at 4 3 9.

our HMO i n Tallahassee

-- which tends to have a younger enrollment population -- i s runni ng
about 3 5 0 days per thousand.

8/ 1 3/ 2 0/ 2 8 . FLORIDA PHYSICIAN MANPOWER
Sl ide 8/14/3 2 / 3 8

FLORIDA
PHYSICIAN
MANPOWER
MID-

MD's

DO's

1 970
1 972
1 974
1 976
1 978
1 980
1 982

7,544
9,600
1 1 ,400
1 3,400
1 5,450
1 7,500
20,200

573
625
730
81 0
890
980
1 , 1 00

Total

(In Millions)

Population

Physicians/1 000

8,1 1 7
1 0,225
1 2, 1 30
1 4,21 0
1 6,340
1 8,480
21 ,300

6.79
7.44
8.25
8.55
8.91
9.80
1 0.35

1 .20
1 .37
1 .47
1 .66
1 .83
1 .89
2.07

Population

Source: K. Penrod, The Community Hospital Education Program

Florida physi ci an manpower is i mportant for both HMO and PPO
development.

We're bei ng approached by physi ci ans from all over

Flori da who are proposi ng new ways of doi ng busi ness.

were 1. 2 per 1, 000; i n 198 2 there were 2. 07 per 1, 000.

I n 1970 there

we see young

physi ci ans coming i nto the communi ty very happy to join HMOs and

PPOs; establi shed physi ci ans are comi ng to us and sayi ng they would
like to be i nvolved i n these programs.

That's i mportant because

the i r cooperati on is a make or break issue.

38

9/14/ 21/ 29 . INITIAL PPO RESULTS
Slide 9/15/33/39

INITIAL RES UL TS REPOR TED B Y
AN ES TABLISHED PPO
EMPLO YEE GROUP (JAN. 82 - A UG. 83)
ALOS
Average Cost
Per Hospital
Day

* Greater Severity of Illnesses

PPO Option

Non-PPO Option

5.4 Days *

5.9 Days

$5 32 *

$635

+ Intensity of Services

• Payments to Physicians by this Denver PPO for 6
Procedures Average 28% Less Than Denver Area UCR
• ALOS for All Enrol lees in this PPO Decreased from
6.5 Days in 1 98 1 to 5 . 7 Days in June 1 983.
Source: Mountain Medical Affiliates

Here is an initial result of a PPO in Denver; its initial because
they're very new.

In comparison to the non-PPO 5. 4 vs. 5. 9. days, .

$532 cost per day vs $63 5 .

( Incidently, in south Florida we have

over 500 physicians who are board certified and board eligible that

have signed up for a program in which their fee schedule is slightly

more than 50% of what we consider to be the upper limit -- which a
lot of other people are charging. )
_ 10/15/2 2/30.

END SPEECH OR BRIDGE TO SUMMARY
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SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATI ONS
NOTE:

This summary can be used at the end of each of the above

modules or as a separate, short (5 -10 mi nute) overvi ew speech.
Slide l. a.
1.
2.
3.

Be fully aware of your company situation.
Be knowledgeable about the health care
industry in your area.
Help stimulate development of competitive
health care markets by:
Promoting devel opment of alternative
o
d elivery systems { HMOs and PPOs) .
Offering alternative delivery programs to
o
your employees.
Implementing cost containment measures in
o
your benefit design.

For employers be aware of your company si tuati on, get i nvolved i n
statistical fi nanci al analysi s.
in your area.

Be knowledgeable about the industry

Help sti mulate the development of competiti ve health

care markets by promoti ng thei r development, by offering alternati ve

programs to your empl oyees, and by i mplementi ng cost contai nment
measures in your benefi t desig n (and eval uati ng them) .
Slide l. b.
4.
5.
6.

Encour age health lifestyles among your
employees and sponsor supportive programs.
Participate in and reorient health planning
and regulation .
Develop coalitions and engage the support of
other businesses in achieving coaliton
objectives.

Encourage healthy lifestyl es, parti ci pate i n and reorient health

planning and regulati on.

they get started.

These thi ngs have a life of their own once

Develop coaliti ons and eng ag e in the support of

other businesses i n achi evi ng coalition obj ectives.
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Slide 2.a.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield recommends a flexible,
incremental, approach to market reform, emphasizing
leadership, rather than legislation, including the
following:
1. Endorse a market reform strategy.
2. Challenge the private sector to get involved.
3 . Authorize s upportive measures. Get the government
to authorize supportive measures (taking long
periods of time for intense scrutiny on contracts
that are totally experimental because they may
violate some aspects of the insurance code or some
other part of the law is co unterproductive) .
4. Selectively deregulate the health care and
insurance industries.
5. Review and redefine the role of the Health care
cost containment Board. ( The average hospital who
got other than a cursory review by staff had
something problemat i c about their budget. At the
end of five years of operation , the Board is
reviewing those hospitals five months after the
year starts. That is not atypical. We cannot
always ass ume that the government operates
smoothly.)
Slide 2.b.
6.
7.
8.

Waive mandated benefits for the competitive models.
Improve the Medicaid Program.
Equitably distribute the burden of indigent care
to allow price competition.
9. Protect and encourage PPO development ( HMO already
has that via Federal law ) .
10. Establish a commission to conduct comprehensive
research.
We are one of the largest states in the Union.

We really don't have

a significant graduate program of education and resultant research
on health care economics and statistics that would give us a work

product.

As a member of the Governor ' s Task Force, I sat for

countless months listening to experts from Baltimore, New York City ,

Connecticut come in and tell me what Florida was like on the

assumption it was li ke the rest of the world.

It was simultaneously

tragic and hilarious because we have very little factual information

about health care and health care economics in Florida.
constitute the recommendations that we have.

Those

I appreciate your time

very much and will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
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